Philosophy of Time Society Forum

Chronos

Dear Members,

I've emailed out the 2008/09 copy of Chronos, today, using our must up-do-date list of email addresses. If you have not received a copy, and think that you should have, please drop me a line: jonathan.tallant@nottingham.ac.uk.

Best wishes,

Jonathan

Minkowski Spatiotemporal Distance

I think I get some things in the special theory of relativity (STR) and in the Minkowski representation thereof. I think I get that there is no two-term earlier-than relation: 'X is earlier than Y' is just not well-formed in the theory. It only makes sense to suppose X is earlier than Y in frame of reference F. Now, the Minkowski representation of STR replaces spatial and temporal relations with a more basic spacetime relation. My question: suppose we take two 'events', E1 and E2, in the Minkowski representation, each occupying just one point. (These are not extended events or wordlines, but instantaneous elements.) Is the question what is the spacetime distance between E1 and E2 well formed? Is there a basic spacetime distance relation that is either frame invariant or frame independent in the Minkowski representation?

---Ernani

Physics constructed from a temporal successor relation

The philosophy of time is apt to be affected by the analytic treatment of time in the formal developments of physics.  I've come to some remarkable encouragement in my attempt to formulate physics entirely in terms of time sequence alone.  My background is in philosophy of science with Grover Maxwell, many years ago.  We shared an understanding of Russell's solution to the mind-body problem.  In 2002-03, I wrote a "belated thesis" for Grover, who is deceased.  It is basically a study of Russell and Whitehead's eventism, titled "The Mind-Body Problem and Its Solution."  In the course of writing, I used simple arrow diagrams to depict what Russell calls "causal structure" and Whitehead calls "temporal succession."  I noticed that what may be called "relative frequency ratios" are formed in such time diagrams.  These may serve physics as relative energy ratios in accord with Planck's E=hf.  This constitutes a structural definition of mass-energy in terms of time sequence alone.  Encouraged by this, I proceeded with more arrow diagram constructions, arriving at a simple 4-D time lattice to replace "space-time."  That in turn led me to the structure of neutrinos and electrons, and the definition of charge quanta.  I extracted the formal material for a separate booklet titled "A Theory of Everything for Physics."  I've been calling the theory "finite eventism."  I have an article with that title, in a book edited by David Skrbina, which was just published.

Please search the phrase "finite eventism" for links to my posted writings on the theory, and to the Amazon web pages for my two self-published books.

-- Carey R. Carlson (guest member)

Call for Abstracts -- Eastern APA 2009

Dear Members,

The Philosophy of Time Society requests submissions of high quality abstracts (150 words) on any topic relating to time for its group meeting at the Eastern APA, December 27-30, 2009, in New York City. Abstracts should be sent by email attachment to me by May 1. Please also advise whether you would be willing to serve as chair or commentator. Volunteers willing to chair or comment but not planning to submit are also welcome.

Sincerely,

Ernani Magalhaes
Secretary, Philosophy of Time Society

Announcement

Dear all,

My paper "Temporal Passage" was posted in the Karl Jaspers Forum (KJF) on
the 8th of July, 2003 as "Target Article 61." The forum's website address
is:

http://www.KJF.ca
http://www.kjf.ca/61-TAAND.htm

The paper can also be accessed at my website:

http://home.att.net/~Andemicael/intro.html

Please read the article. And if you have any comments, please feel free to
post them at the KJF site.

Best regards,

Adhanom Andemicael
Andemicael@att.net

Call for papers: Pacific APA

The Philosophy of Time Society requests submissions of high-quality abstracts (150 words) on any topic relating to time for its group meeting at the 2009 Pacific APA, April 8-12, in Vancouver. Abstracts should be sent to L. Nathan Oaklander at lno@umflint.edu by September 30. Please also advise whether you would be willing to serve as chair or commentator.

Merleau-Ponty conference announcement

Ryerson University is hosting the upcoming 33rd annual conference of the International Merleau-Ponty Circle:

"Time, Memory, and the Self: Remembering Merleau-Ponty at 100"

Ryerson University, September 18-20

See the conference website for details.

New Anthology: The Philosophy of Time

Routledge has just released a four-volume anthology on the philosophy of time, edited by L. Nathan Oaklander. See attached PDF for information. Download philosophy_time_std.pdf 

Call for papers: Central APA

The Philosophy of Time Society requests submissions of high-quality abstracts (150 words) on any topic relating to time for its group meeting at the Central APA, February 18-21, in Chicago. Abstracts should be sent to L. Nathan Oaklander at lno@umflint.edu by August 15. Please also advise whether you would be willing to serve as chair or commentator.

Your contact information needed!

We have a number of new and renewed members for whom we have neither a valid email address nor snail mail address. If you are a member and have not received any communications from us recently, or have recently changed your email address and/or mailing address, please send your new contact info to our Treasurer, Trevor Jennings at tej_talbot@hotmail.com.

McTaggart and Presentism

I've been doing some research on McTaggart's Paradox and its relation to presentism.  Bill Craig thinks that the best response to McTaggart's Paradox is to endorse presentism.

Question 1: Which articles do people take to be the most clear, penetrating, and helpful discussions of McTaggart's Paradox?  I'd like to understand it better.

Question 2: I've read most of Craig's stuff on the topic relating McTaggart's Paradox to presentism.  Is anybody aware of other authors who have written on their relation?  Which articles would you recommend?

Time on Trial Conference Pictures

The conference on McTaggart's argument, "Time on Trial," was a big success I think. Pictures of the event are available at www.wvu.edu/~philosophy/timeontrial.html. We'll have video of the conference up there shortly. I'll have an update on the publication of the proceedings as soon as I have definite details.

Ernani Magalhaes

Call for Papers: Eastern Division APA

We are issuing a call for abstracts for the Eastern Division Meeting of
the Philosophy of Time Society on December 27-30, 2008, Philadelphia,
PA- Marriott Hotel. The deadline for submission is May 15, 2008 and
notification will occur on or before May 31, 2008. Please send your
abstract to Nathan Oaklander at lno@umflint.edu

Goedel told me so

    Since time is a physical quantity which can measured with fantastic accuracy, I've always taken it for granted.   By chance I ran across the PTS and it has introduced me to the many paradoxes inherent in time.  I have just read a book by Palle Yourgrau entitled "A World Without TIme: The Forgotten Legacy of Goedel and Einstein."  Kurt Goedel was perhaps  the greatest logician of the 20th century, if not of all time.  Goedel and Einstein became close friends in 1942 at the Princeton Institute for Advanced Studies.  Einstein taught Goedel general relativity.  Goedel developed a cosmology based on a rotating universe which was consistent with general relativity.  According to Yourgrau this consistency has never been dis-proven.  In Goedel's universe time was cyclical, hence it was possible to travel into the past.  Goedel concluded that the existence of time was inconsistent with general relativity.  To this day, this conclusion is either disbelieved or ignored.   Yourgrau states that "Rarely have so many understood so little about so much."  If one has the time(?), this book is well written and is a fun read for anyone interested in mathematical logic, physics, and the characters that once inhabited these domains.
    L J Swartzendruber

New bibliography

Check out the new on line bibliography for the philosophy of mind and consciousness studies at http://consc.net/mindpapers. There are two subsections listing lots of papers from philosophy and beyond on "temporal consciousness" and "time and consciousness."

This philosophy of mind site raises the question, perhaps we should put together our own group bibliography on time studies...

Truthmaker is a Goner

I've been reading Trenton Merricks' new book Truth and Ontology, and he spends the first few chapters beating up on Truthmaker.  I now think that Truthmaker is a goner.

"Truthmaker says that for every true claim there is something or other that - just by existing - makes that claim true" (p. 1).  If Truthmaker is true, then presentists who believe that propositions like D: that there were dinosaurs are true are in trouble because it seems that nothing presently exists to make (D) true.  Similar things could be said for propositions about brute dispositions, modal properties, subjunctive conditionals (including counterfactuals of freedom), and so on.  The principle motivation behind Truthmaker, Merricks points out, is to "catch the cheaters" - cheaters like presentists.

A big objection to Truthmaker is that negative existentials like H: that Hobbits don't exist don't need truthmakers but are true.  (H) is obviously true.  So Truthmaker is false.

Merricks devotes chapter 3 to dealing with ways that the Truthmaker theorist might try to account for the truths of negative existentials.  Perhaps the universe has the property of being such that there are no hobbits, and this property is the truthmaker for (H).  But then cheaters can make the same move.  They can say that the proposition (D) is made true by the universe's having the property of being such that there were dinosaurs.

Or perhaps (H) is made true by the totality of all existing objects in the universe.  But all this could exist and (H) could be false.  (It's possible that all existing objects in the universe exist and Hobbits exist as well.)

Perhaps (H) is made true by the totality of all existing objects in the universe and the universe's having the property being such that there is nothing else.  But then, as mentioned above, there doesn't seem to be a principled reason to disallow properties like being such that there were dinosaurs.

Merricks' response to that last objection is what did it for me.  Truthmaker theorists should move on to defending other principles like "truth supervenes on being" or they should formulate new principles.  But maybe my conclusion is to quick.  Is there any hope for Truthmaker?

Constituents of Times

Some people define a time as a maximally consistent set of propositions.  It seems to me that this is false because a set has its members essentially, but what is true at a time is only contingently true at that time.  (So that Bill walks to the store is the true at t, but it could have been false at t.)

But a bunch of smart people think of times as sets of propositions.  Consider:

Thomas Crisp:

"x is a time =df. For some class C of propositions such that C is maximal and consistent, x=[Ay(y is a member of C -> y is true]." ("Presentism and the Grounding Objection", Nous 41:1, 2007, p. 99)

(The "A" should stand for the universal quantifier.  In the article, Crisp cites Chisholm, Edward Zalta, Arthur Prior, Kit Fine, and Matthew Davidson as holding similar views.  Crisp's view strikes me as bizarre, since the only time that exists is the present time since that's the only one that's true.  But I bet I'm missing something really obvious.)

Ned Markosian

"There is the abstract present time, which is a maximal, consistent proposition.  There are many things that are similar to the abstract present time in being maximal, consistent propositions that either will be true, are true, or have been true.  Each one is a time.  The abstract present time is the only one of all of these abstract times that happens to be true now." ("A Defense of Presentism", Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 1, 2003, p. 76)

Robin Le Poidevin

"An instant, that is, is equated with all the propositions which would ordinarily be described as being (contingently) true at that instant.  The content of the propositions concerns the states of affairs taking place at that instant..." (Change, Cause, and Contradiction, 1991, p. 37)

(Here, Le Poidevin is referring to Prior's views, though he thinks that all presentists are committed to this definition.)

Craig Bourne

"I propose we construct times using maximally consistent sets of u-propositions, which intuitively we can see as those u-propositions that are true at that time." (A Future for Presentism, 2006, p. 53-54)

(By "u-proposition", Bourne is referring to a proposition without a past or future tense operator on it.)

The point that what is true at a time is contingent was pointed out by W.L. Craig in his critique of Le Poidevin's critique of presentism (A Tensed Theory of Time, p. 213), and Craig cites van Inwagen as noting this in his article "Indexicality and Actuality", 1980, footnote 3).

I think that Craig and Van Inwagen are right.  But doesn't this then make Crisp, Markosian, and Bourne's view of times implausible?

Are presentism/eternalism, etc. metaphysical or empirical claims?

Some claim that presentism is falsified by special relativity. Does that make presentism a contingent truth? If the speed of light were infinite, would that change matters for presentism? Do eternalism or the growing block theory, if true, have the status of metaphysical truth?

Eastern APA Meeting Papers

The paper Adrian Bardon will be presenting at the Eastern APA PTS meeting, "Kant and the Conventionality of Simultaneity," is available at the following link: bardon_simultaneity.doc

McTaggart Conference

April 25 and 26, 2008 West Virginia University will host "Time on Trial: One Hundred Years of McTaggart's Argument Against Time," a conference commemorating the anniversay of McTaggart's "The Unreality of Time." I'm pleased to announce we will have three outstanding keynote speakers: Nathan Oaklander, Quentin Smith, and Michael Tooley.

Quality submissions - 3,000 words - are also sought. They should be sent in blind review format to the email address below by November 1. The proceedings will be published in Philosophia.

Ernani Magalhaes (ernani.magalhaes@mail.wvu.edu)

McTaggart Anniversary

So next year is the 100th anniversary of the publication of "The Unreality of Time", which first introduced the notions of "A-series" and "B-series" to the philosophical literature. Is there anything being done to celebrate this? It seems like there should be some sort of conference on McTaggart's argument, considering it is arguably the most influential article in our field.

We Need a Chair and a Commentator for the Eastern APA

We need a chair for the group PTS meeting at the Eastern APA. We also need a commentator for Yuri Balashov's paper on coexistence. Please! Email me: ernani.magalhaes@mail.wvu.edu

Presentism and Special Relativity

I was once a presentist, but I have become convinced that special relativity makes presentism untenable. I would be interested in hearing what others have to say on this subject.

Temporal Relations

   Who thinks that ersatz B-relations provide an adequate solution to the so-called "problem of relations?" 

Eastern Division PTS Meetings

Ernâni Magalhães is going to comment on the paper by Adrian. If anyone is interested in commenting on Yuri's paper please contact me at lno@umflint.edu. Thanks. Nathan

Papers to be presented at the Eastern APA Meeting, December 2007, Baltimore, MD:

"Kant and the Conventionality of Simultaneity"

Adrian Bardon

Wake Forest University

www.wfu.edu/~bardona

Abstract:

Kant’s three Analogies of Experience, in his Critique of Pure Reason, represent a highly condensed attempt to establish the metaphysical foundations of Newtonian physics. His strategy is to show that the organization of experience in terms of a world of enduring substances undergoing mutual causal interaction is a necessary condition of the temporal ordering even of one’s own subjective states, and thus of coherent experience itself. In his Third Analogy—an examination of the necessary conditions of judgments of simultaneous existence—he argues that certain conceptual presuppositions consistent with Newtonian physics are necessary to time-awareness. His argument, however, appears to be undermined by conventionalism in natural science generally, and by the conventionality of simultaneity in particular. In this paper I discuss Kant’s claims in light of contemporary relativity theory. I suggest that, while his project is obsolete in major respects, there may still be useful insights into time-awareness to be drawn from his work.

"Against Alexandrov Present and Alexandrov Coexistence"

Yuri Balashov

University of Georgia

http://yuri.myweb.uga.edu

Abstract:

On eternalism, there is a sense in which all the inhabitants of spacetime coexist with each other, simply because all such entities—dinosaurs, Nebuchadnezzar, Jacques Chirac, etc.—exist, at their respective spacetime locations. But even the eternalist must admit that there is another sense of the coexistence relation such that she bears this relation to Chirac but not to Nebuchadnezzar. This sense of coexistence is familiar and important and its application is not limited to sentient beings. The Great Wall of China coexists, in this interesting sense, with the Taj Mahal, but there was a time when it did not. Can the interesting notion of coexistence be extrapolated to Minkowski spacetime? To the extent that this is possible it requires certain adjustments in the notion. The need to make the adjustments reveals two distinct strands in the "intuitive lore" of the coexistence relation. They work together in the classical setting but come apart in the relativistic context, thus giving rise to two different sets of rules associated with the use of the interesting concept of coexistence. Which of them, if any, can claim the title? I will consider the alternatives and defend my preferences.

A complete draft of Yuri's paper can be found at:

http://yuri.myweb.uga.edu/Working/coexistence_in_minkowski_spacetime.pdf

Call for abstracts--Metaphysics of Time

Richard Davies of the University of Bergamo (Italy) has announced a call for abstracts for the upcoming Metaphysics of Time conference in Bergamo, scheduled for September 6-8, 2007. For details, visit the conference website at www.unibg.it/metaphysics-of-time.

PTS Meeting Times

I would like to start a discussion about our current arrangements for meeting at the APA. My impression is that we invariably get stuck with the worst possible time slots (like Saturday evenings), which makes for rather low attendance at our talks. Why can't we get a different time slot, or at least have the APA rotate us with other societies that now meet at more attractive times?

Oxford Handbook on Time!

Craig Callender is editing the forthcoming Oxford Handbook on Time. Here is a preliminary list of contributors with preliminary chapter titles (in alphabetic order):

• Frank Arntzenius, The CPT Theorem
• David Atkinson and Jan Hilgevoord, Time and Quantum Mechanics
• Yuri Balashov, Persistence versus Endurance
• Craig Bourne, Fatalism
• David Brink, Time and Ethics
• Barry Dainton, Growing Block Theory
• David Eagleman, Neural Basis of Time Perception
• John Earman, The Electromagnetic Arrow of Time
• Christoph Hoerl, Time in Animal and Developmental Psychology
• Carl Hoefer, Probability and Time
• Jenann Ismael, Time and the Self
• Claus Kiefer, Time in Quantum Gravity
• Barry Loewer, Time and Laws of Nature
• Jean Pierre Luminet, Time, Topology and the Twin Paradox
• Ulrich Meyer, Time and Modality
• Joshua Mozersky, Presentism
• Jill North, Time in Thermodynamics
• Huw Price, The Flow of Time
• Steven Savitt, Time in Special Relativity
• Lawrence Sklar, Time in Classical Mechanics
• Christopher Smeenk and Christopher Wüthrich, Time Travel
• Jean Paul van Bendegem, On the Possibility of Discrete Time
• Dean Zimmerman, Becoming

Welcome!

Welcome to the Philosophy of Time Society Forum. Members of the Society are invited to post messages and comment on posts. To join the Society click on the "join the PTS" link on the left.